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(De-)Activating the growth machine for redevelopment: 
The case of Liede urban village in Guangzhou 
 
Abstract 
This research investigates the mechanism of urban village redevelopment in 
south China. Through a revised typology of place entrepreneurs based on the 
growth machine thesis and a case study of Liede village in central Guangzhou, it 
illustrates how land-based interests embedded in an imbalanced power 
relationship can (de-)activate urban village redevelopment. The study reveals 
that while urban villagers, as represented by the village collective, have 
entrenched interests in the redevelopment process, the city government—as 
monopolistic land manager and place entrepreneur—plays the deciding role in 
forging and halting a growth machine geared towards urban village 
redevelopment. Although developers are also part of the process, the 
(de-)activation of redevelopment growth machine/coalition in Guangzhou has 
largely been dominated by the city government. With a comparative view on the 
original growth machine model, it is hoped that this study would furnish both 
theoretical and practical thoughts for future research. 
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Introduction 
After more than three decades of rapid urbanisation (Ding, 2007; Han, 2010), 
many Chinese metropolises are facing an increasing shortage of developable 
land. As a consequence, the central government has begun to shift its policy 
focus from fresh green field land to land within the existing built-up areas, and 
encourage local governments to engage in urban redevelopment and improve 
land use efficiency (Lin, 2015). At the frontier of China’s economic reform, 
Guangdong Province has thus been entrusted with a new policy experiment, i.e. 
‘Sanjiu Gaizao’ (or the ‘Three-Old’ Redevelopment Policy) in 2008. The policy 
aims at implementing a set of arrangements for redeveloping three different 
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types of old areas—dilapidated neighborhoods, old factories and urban villages 
(or chengzhongcun)—across the province. 
Of the three types of old areas, urban village is perhaps the most important 
and intricate one. In the Chinese context, an ‘urban village’ refers to the kind of 
village that has been spatially encircled by urban development yet still retains an 
institutionally-recognised rural status due to the collective ownership of land 
(Tian, 2008; Li and Xu, 2008). Existing literature suggests that a ‘win-win’ 
benefits distribution among stakeholders is critical to accelerating the 
redevelopment of urban villages (Li, 2002; Tian, 2008; Li et al., 2014). The 
stakeholders here generally include indigenous villagers, commercial developers 
and city governments, each with their own set of interests. According to various 
research, ‘win-win’ benefits distribution among stakeholders is usually 
achievable through either a ‘collaborative coalition’ (Hin and Xin, 2011), 
‘collaborative mode’ (Li et al., 2014), or ‘partnership’ (Zhao and Webster, 2011; 
Lin and Meulder, 2012). However, largely due to the lack of empirical data, most 
previous studies seem to have focused on either describing the implementation 
of redevelopment plans for certain urban villages, or just listing the types and 
quantities of stakeholders’ interests at a specific time. A detailed analysis of the 
underlying power relations between stakeholders in the redevelopment process, 
therefore, is often missing.  
On the theoretical front, although much research has examined China’s 
urban renewal/redevelopment taking place on state-owned land (He and Wu, 
2005; Shin, 2009), fewer studies have attempted to extend relevant theoretical 
models or perspectives to understand urban village redevelopment. Built on 
previous work on the political economy of urban villages (Hsing, 2010; Hao et al. 
2011; Zhang, 2011; Zhao and Webster, 2011), this paper will revisit the typology 
of place entrepreneurs in the growth machine thesis and explore through a case 
study how land-based interests embedded in an imbalanced power relationship 
can (de-)activate urban village redevelopment. Drawing on the data obtained 
from local governments, this research also intends to set the redevelopment of 
one particular urban village, namely Liede Village in central Guangzhou, in a 
wider urban policy context.  
The remainder of this paper consists of five sections. The second section will 
review the literature on one core aspect of the growth machine thesis, i.e. the 
role of place entrepreneurs in local growth across varied political-economic 
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contexts. The following section will focus on how the idea of growth machine 
may be deployed for understanding redevelopment activities in Chinese cities. 
By proposing a revised framework for deciphering the land-based interests of 
different place entrepreneurs during urban village redevelopment, the fourth 
section intends to cast the growth machine model in a new light. Set in a 
changing urban policy agenda, the fifth section presents the case study of Liede 
Village in central Guangzhou as well as the reason behind city-wide halt of urban 
village redevelopment afterwards. To sum up the research, further thoughts are 
offered in the last section. 
Place entrepreneurs and the contextualisation of growth machine thesis 
In probing how places get built in the US, the original thesis put forward by 
Molotch (1976), and later jointly by Logan and Molotch (1987), posits the 
functioning of local growth machines wheeled by place entrepreneurs for 
augmenting parochial interests through land-use intensification. According to 
Logan and Molotch (1987, p. 29), place entrepreneurs are defined as ‘the people 
directly involved in the exchange of places and collection of rents’. Three types 
of place entrepreneurs, or ‘modern urban rentiers’, are key to the understanding 
of a growth machine, i.e. serendipitous entrepreneurs, active entrepreneurs, and 
structural speculators. Of the three, though, emphasis has been placed on the 
last type, which is perceived to be capable of altering the prospect and spatial 
pattern of local development through ‘organisational manipulations’. Despite 
their different influences, all place entrepreneurs are believed to be gearing 
towards local growth—which is seen as ‘an aggregate of land-based interests’ 
(Molotch, 1976, p. 310). 
During the following two decades, while cases studies and comparative 
research along similar lines had abounded (Logan et al., 1997; Jonas and 
Wilson, 1999), debate on the composition and operation of growth 
machines/coalitions in different contexts appeared to have relegated place 
entrepreneurs to a less prominent position. As Rodgers (2009, p. 16) has noted, 
‘the complex sets of agency supposedly making up growth coalitions remain in 
empirical practice a largely unexamined, independent variable’. This said, 
among those who do accord importance to place entrepreneurs, Molotch (1979) 
has reiterated the intermediary role played by landed elites in ‘preparing the 
ground’ for local growth, with the caveat that the fine line between parochial 
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rentier and non-local capitalist would begin to erode. Elsewhere, urban 
political-economic conditions specific to Japan and Italy have been illustrated by 
case studies, in which local place entrepreneurs are found to be constrained 
either by the hierarchical structure of the state, or the in situ political/party 
system (Molotch and Vicari, 1988; Vicari and Molotch, 1990). However, apart 
from a number of studies which have touched on the contextual differences 
between British and North American growth machines (Wood, 1999; Ward, 
2000), research attention is yet to be adequately paid to place entrepreneurs in 
more non-US settings (Harding, 1999; Rodgers, 2009).  
Over the past ten years, there has been renewed interest in retooling the 
growth machine thesis for urban research (Light, 2002; Phelps, 2012). More 
importantly, increased attention has been paid to a few post-socialist countries in 
an attempt to engage Western theoretical model with local realities (Kulcsar and 
Domokos, 2005; Golubchikov and Phelps, 2011). In a rather different context, 
Kulcsar and Domokos (2005, p. 551) have re-confirmed that ‘the growth 
machine is essentially a power elite model’ (see also Harding, 1995). However, 
given the specificities of social and political-economic situations, the functioning 
of growth machine will vary considerably—not only in the organisation of 
place-bound elites, but also the ways in which external investors and state 
resources are orchestrated locally. Mapping the placeless growth of Khimki, a 
municipality on the edge of Moscow, Golubchikov and Phelps (2011) have 
reported the development of a post-socialist suburb in a nested political 
setting—which features a lack of coordinated elite/coalition in a compressed 
urbanisation process. The agency of land-based interests notwithstanding, it 
seems that the political-economic conditions under which place entrepreneurs 
operate are also essential to explaining the mechanism of a growth machine. In 
more recent studies, the indispensable role played by the state, local or 
otherwise, has as well been highlighted in the cases of reshaping Tysons Corner 
(Phelps, 2012) and Houston’s Chinatowns (Knapp and Vojnovic, 2013) in the US. 
To bring the above discussions into conversation with relevant work on a 
fast-urbanising China, the next section will examine how the idea of growth 
machine/coalition may inform cross-national research in another distinct context. 
Locating (pro-)growth machine/coaltion in urban China 
Over several decades, the growth machine theory has been an influential model 
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for explaining city development and urban renewal in the US (and beyond) 
(Logan and Molotch, 1987; Jonas and Wilson, 1999; Gotham, 2001a, 2001b). As 
the evolvement of growth machine thesis has in large measure been 
accompanied by the rising popularity of regime analysis in urban politics (Logan 
et al., 1997; Harding, 1999), quite often the notion of ‘pro-growth coalition’ would 
be adopted to characterise an associated group of elites who apparently 
dominate the prospects of a locality. For those who may want to distinguish 
between these two approaches to urban analysis, i.e. growth machine and urban 
regime, some difficulties would normally arise. More often than not, the bonding 
mechanism of local landed elites has tended to be underplayed in most case 
studies, whereas the political side of urban growth would usually eclipse the part 
played by land and property in coalitional analyses.  
So far, research into the working of (pro-)growth coalitions in China, with few 
exceptions, has also been focused on the political dimension of urban 
(re)development. Even though great progress has been made in reforming the 
country’s economic realm since the late 1970s, urban (re)development in 
Chinese cities is still very much a state-dominated process (Wu, 2002; Wu et al., 
2013; Wu, 2015b). Economic growth, a top priority on central and local 
governments’ agenda, has to be enacted by politically-entrusted territorial units, 
whether urban or rural, through a hierarchical state. In a rescaled context where 
urban landed interests (rural land and properties excluded) have become 
marketable and thus essential to economic development, local (pro-)growth 
coalitions have proliferated; and the growth machine thesis, right because of its 
focus on land and property development, is arguably a very productive tool for 
understanding a rapidly urbanising China, where city expansion, 
suburbanisation and restless redevelopment inextricably overlap. 
While there have been earlier attempts to localise the idea of (pro-)growth 
coalition in a few major Chinese cities (Zhu, 1999; Zhang, 2002; Zhang and Wu, 
2008), other studies have suggested that certain features of urban growth 
machine are well to be found in China’s dynamic urban expansion and 
redevelopment (Zhang and Fang, 2004; Han, 2010). Of late, a body of literature 
has emerged in an effort to approach urban transformations in China from a 
political-economic perspective (Lin, 2007; Hsing, 2010; Wu, 2015a). Most 
notably, urban coalition and (pro-)growth machine are among the revisited 
concepts thought to be useful for deciphering land-centred redevelopment 
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politics across the country (Yang and Chang, 2007; Zhang, 2014). Contrasting 
the mechanisms of urban growth in inner-city areas or on newly-developed land, 
battles fought on collective turfs, i.e. redevelopment of (sub-)urban villages, have 
also taken scholarly interest beyond the boundaries of state-owned land (Wu, et 
al., 2013; Lang et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2016). 
As a significant component in the redevelopment process, urban villages 
represent a peculiar type of space located at the urban and rural interface, 
posing both theoretical and practical challenges to policy-makers and 
researchers in many Chinese cities. The conundrum of urban village 
redevelopment stems from the duality of China’s land management system (Lin 
and Ho, 2005), whereby villages encircled by rapid urban expansion have 
become collectively-owned enclaves amid state land. So far, although much 
debate has pointed out the institutional obstacles to the redevelopment of urban 
village (Liu et al., 2012a; Song, 2015; Lai et al., 2016), localised configurations of 
landed interests per se still call for more research either from a 
political-economic vantage point (Zhang, 2011), or a more pronounced 
coalitional approach (Hin and Xin, 2011; Lin et al., 2015).  
It is argued that not only in physical, but also in institutional terms, 
redevelopment of urban villages should fit aptly into a place-bound growth 
process which embodies some key features of Logan and Molotch’s theorisation 
(1987). Most importantly, the dualistic land/property ownership system 
underlying the interests redistribution during urban village redevelopment has in 
fact revealed an imbalanced power relationship between a few basic types of 
place entrepreneurs in urban China. Furthermore, given the salience of land and 
property in urban village redevelopment—most often in the forms of on-site or 
relocated re-settlement and monetary compensation, the political economy of 
reshaping such transitional spaces could also enrich our understanding of 
locality growth in a rather different urbanisation context. However, to better tailor 
the growth machine thesis for cross-national utilisation, we are also aware that 
its original theoretical model will need to undergo some revision before empirical 
analysis could proceed for a fruitful dialogue (Jonas and Wilson, 1999). 
Growth machine and urban village redevelopment: a revised framework 
A redevelopment growth machine working in the grounds of China’s urban 
villages needs to source its conceptual elements locally. Yet, certain component 
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parts originally offered by Logan and Molotch (1987) for profiling a growth 
machine in the US are still highly pertinent. Despite institutional dissimilarities, a 
social typology of place entrepreneurs is readily distinguishable in China’s urban 
villages. First, while ordinary urban villagers are like a proactive group of 
serendipitous entrepreneurs, the village collective—community orgainisation 
representing the overall interest of an urban village—could well be seen as an in 
situ ‘structural entrepreneur’. All of them, needless to say, rely heavily on the 
rents derived from the locational benefits of their village, especially when it 
happens to be near the city centre. The village collective, in particular, with its 
representative bargaining power, is normally comprised of indigenous elites able 
to negotiate with or even contend against outside developer and local 
government when defending community interests. 
Second, unlike in a western growth coalition, local governments entrusted to 
monopolise de facto public land ownership in Chinese cities are a distinctive 
type of agency. As far as redevelopment of urban villages is concerned, local 
governments acting as proxy state-land owners—be they at the county, district, 
city or municipal level—that have a final say not only on the development of 
public land, but also on the ascertainment and urbanisation of rural land within 
their administrative confines. In contrast to urban villagers and their collective 
organisation, who tend to stick to parochial interests, local governments normally 
would have broader visions and policy objectives for urban (re)development 
across their territorial area. More to the point, under a dualistic land/property 
ownership system, political powers over legally acquiring, converting and then 
transacting rural land on the market to make it ‘urban’ are a monopoly of specific 
levels of government (see the case study below). Although with many 
characteristics of a structural speculator as depicted in Logan and Molotch’s 
original thesis, it is the overarching decision-making power that ultimately 
defines the agency of China’s local state. Rather than intermediating between 
rentiers and developers, local governments here are far more authoritative and 
powerful in enabling locality growth and managing land-use change (He and Wu, 
2005; Lin and Ho, 2005). And indeed, we would argue that most (pro-)growth 
coalitions formed as such will hinge upon local governments acting as a 
‘monopolistic land manager and place entrepreneur’, who would naturally 
become the pivot of growth machine politics. 
   In addition, the functioning of a growth machine/coalition for urban village 
8 
 
redevelopment follows a more complicated logic than that of ‘value-free’ 
development (Logan and Molotch, 1987). To leverage the financial resources 
from real estate developers, such machinery has to secure the involvement of 
market forces with government blessing or endorsement. Typically, urban village 
redevelopment is guided by local governments towards a growth agenda, often 
through property-led renewal (Hin and Xin, 2011; Wu, 2015a). With rules of 
game set and locality-specific goals formulated, it is subsequently for those 
active entrepreneurs to strategise on the prospects of redevelopment 
investments. In fact, fiscally-tight local government would rather encourage an 
urban village and developer(s) to form a self-administered coalition than have to 
incur financial burden on public coffers. In this sense, we would argue that the 
original growth machine model could be complemented by extending the rubric 
of active entrepreneurs to include certain institutional investors; operating in a 
circumscribed arena—as outside developers have to navigate the complexities 
of speculating on converted rural land, these strategic entrepreneurs are much 
less dominant than those landed or corporate elites going for ‘value-free’ 
development in a capitalist society. 
For a growth machine to work for urban village redevelopment, it is crucial 
that land-based interests should be generated and redistributed in a way that 
binds the involved parties together. At the heart of growth machine theory is the 
dialectics of use value and exchange value of land. In our revised social typology 
of place entrepreneurs, however, the value scales are arguably inclined more 
towards “exchange” than “use”—partly because urban village redevelopment 
entails more than planning and building on a tabula rasa. Although all coalitional 
parties will expect to maximise their gains, the forms in which their interests take 
could vary. Anticipated as well as realised growth in land/property price being the 
ultimate source of value increments, we would propose a more elaborate 
framework for deciphering the land-based interests involved in activating a 
growth machine for urban village redevelopment. 
   What is more, urban village collective and villagers are place-bound actors 
with landed interests. Both of them have use value to secure during 
redevelopment, albeit out of differing concerns. Urban villagers losing 
homestead in the process are primarily concerned about replacement housing 
and compensation, whereas the village collective, representative of community 
interests, is due to safeguard and increase the village’s welfare with the whole 
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locality in mind. On top of use value, redevelopment is also expected to bring 
substantial rent increments (or else there would be no need to have the village 
bulldozed and rebuilt)—especially for those centrally-located urban villages. 
Perhaps not entirely a windfall, the increased exchange value of redeveloped 
land/properties is certainly much welcomed, if not actively demanded, by the 
village collective and villagers. Unlike villagers, who through inheritance are 
serendipitous individuals, the village collective even has institutional capacity 
stemming from collective land title to bargain with outside players as well as 
change the structural conditions for locality development. Of course, a key 
element to urban village redevelopment is the engagement of real estate 
developers. To assemble a growth machine able to secure funds from committed 
developers, the exchange value of land/property after redevelopment will have 
to be substantial enough to entice strategic investors (most probably) from 
outside an urban village. 
   On the other hand, through its monopoly over urban land and administrative 
powers—particularly planning, local government plays a dominant role in the 
redevelopment process. Despite unresolved urban-rural cleavage, local 
government tends to view the city as a territorial ensemble geared towards the 
accumulation of land-centred interests (Lin, 2007, 2009; Hsing, 2010). In order to 
realize a tally of political, economic, social, and environmental interests (Chen 
and Xu, 2011), local governments would usually take the steering position in 
handling various policy issues, balancing social and environmental concerns, or 
even making concessions where necessary to either accelerate or slow down 
redevelopment. As to urban village redevelopment, local government would be 
more concerned with an effective solution to the issue in general, although they 
do prioritise certain villages over the others, recognising locational specificity. 
Given the rural perimeter, it would seem that neither the use value nor the 
exchange value on collective land may be directly gleaned by local government; 
nevertheless, villages thriving within the city do cause headaches for urban 
management. Issues of public safety, sanitary regulation, migrant population and 
shanty images…could cause surrounding state-land to lose part of exchange as 
well as use value. Local government, as ‘monopolistic land manager and place 
entrepreneur’, will likewise have considerable interests at stake.  
   By linking conceptual framework with empirical research, the remainder of 
this paper will present the case study of Liede urban village in Guangzhou, a 
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metropolis in south China, where the activation and halting of redevelopment 
growth machine has plenty to offer for comparative thinking.  
The (De-)Activation of redevelopment growth machine: a case study of 
Liede urban village 
In Guangzhou, the provincial capital of Guangdong and the largest city in south 
China, because of rapid urbanisation over recent decades, a growing demand 
for both low-rent informal housing by rural migrants (Wang et al., 2009) and 
centrally-located commercial and office space by enterprises has led to a 
proliferation of urban villages in the city. In 2009, altogether there were 138 
officially registered urban villages across Guangzhou (according to ‘the 56th 
policy’, see below). As early as the 1990s, the city government had sought to 
redevelop some of the villages located in the inner-city area, but not until the 
year 2010 did it finally succeed in redeveloping the village of Liede. The first of 
its kind and probably the most representative case (Sun et al. 2017), Liede 
village offers an important opportunity for us to look into the activation of a 
growth machine for urban village redevelopment.  
Motivated by the ‘Sanjiu Gaizao’ Policy, the Guangzhou government 
announced an ambitious scheme in 2009 to redevelop 52 urban villages over a 
period of 3 to 5 years. The scheme was publicized in a policy document entitled 
‘Opinions on Accelerating the Redevelopment of Old Towns, Old Factories and 
Urban Villages’ (commonly known as ‘the 56th policy’). By April 2012, 
redevelopment plans for more than 20 urban villages had been approved by the 
city government, of which 9 centrally-located ones were to be demolished before 
the 2010 Asian Games (GURB, 2012b). 
Liede village occupies the south and central part of Pearl River New Town 
(PRNT), the new central business district of Guangzhou, and is situated on the 
bank north of the Pearl River, across from Haixinsha Island (Figure 1), where the 
opening ceremony of the 16th Asian Games was staged in 2010. Before 
redevelopment, it had 3,167 local households (totaling 7,865 villagers) and  
about 17,000 migrants within an area of 336,000 m² (GURB, 2012a). 
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Figure 1. Location of Liede village in the PRNT and Guangzhou 
Source: authors. 
 
Landed interests: urban villagers and the village collective 
As discussed earlier, the dualistic land/property ownership system in China has 
clearly differentiated urban and rural lands. Consequently, indigenous residents 
in urban villages are in fact a group of serendipitous city dwellers and rentiers 
represented by their collective organisation. Liede village, with its prime location 
in downtown Guangzhou, is just a typical example. Through self-help 
development and densification on collective land, by 2005, two types of property 
had been in operation for the benefit of the village collective and the villagers. 
The first type was collective properties built on 350 mu (1 hectare = 15 mu) of 
Liede village’s economic devleopment land, and the second type was villagers’ 
private houses built on 470 mu of rural residential land (zhaijidi) (The Liede 
Village Committee, 2005).  
More than just inheriting family property, urban villagers have responded 
proactively to changing surroundings. In order to rent out as many rooms for 
profits, they had built houses far exceeding the maximum regulatory standard of 
3.5 storeys, bringing the gross FAR (floor area ratio) of Liede to 2.2 before 
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redevelopment (GURB, 2012b). These properties could generate approximately 
25,000 RMB per year per person (GURB, 2012a), which again had strengthened 
the villagers’ identity as a place-bound interest group with common gains as well 
as a clear boundary from outside society (Kan, 2016). 
There are further factors which bond the villagers together. First, they co-run 
collectively-owned properties through a shareholding company with regular 
shareholder meetings, a board of directors and a board of supervisors. Since 
1994, dividends from rented properties have become a major source of income 
for most shareholding villagers. Also, due to the shortage of municipal funds (Li 
and Xu, 2008), the company has to take responsibility for providing public 
services and infrastructure inside the village with the support of rental incomes 
from leasing collectively-owned properties. Suffice it to say that parochial 
interests from collective land and properties are well-entrenched in Liede, thus 
enabling the village to stand staunch in the face of unwelcomed redevelopment 
initiatives, especially those perceived as imposed by the local government. 
The pre-redevelopment context: city government vs the Liede Village 
Committee 
In the late 1990s, in the wake of possibly losing its leading position in regional 
development, the city government of Guangzhou proposed a long-term strategy 
to improve its physical environment so as to become an international metropolis. 
Urban village redevelopment was therefore brought onto the government’s 
working agenda. However, when speaking on city-wide visions, the then mayor 
of Guangzhou made it clear that developing new districts should take priority 
over redeveloping urban villages—for newly-developed districts were expected 
to reduce the resident population in urban villages and lower the cost of 
subsequent redevelopment (Lin, 2013). In other words, the policy objective then 
set for existing urban villages was to improve their physical environment and 
decrease urban density. 
One effective approach to achieving the objective was to control the 
redevelopment FAR. In 2004, the city government issued some guidance for 
Liede village redevelopment in an official document, the main points of which 
included: (1) the total redevelopment FAR must be lower than 4.0; (2) on-site 
resettlment must be done according to the principle of ‘one household one plot’; 
(3) the land area of all rebuilt houses must each be smaller than 100 m² and no 
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higher than 3.5 stories (GUPB, 2004). Following these instructions, the 
‘Redevelopment Plan of Liede village in Tianhe District’ (2005) then set the net 
redevelopment FAR at 3.95, the gross residential floorspace at 665,000 m² and 
the collective-owned property (a planned hotel) at 120,000 m² (GTDUPB, 2005) 
(Table 1).  
 
 
In December 2005, the Liede Village Committee refused to accpet the plan 
and made representations to the government. Their arguments mainly focused 
on land-based interests: (1) compared with surrounding urban plots, the 4.0 FAR 
was too low and hence the use value of redeveloped site would not be fully 
realised—and their opinion was to raise it to 6.0-6.5; (2) the FAR set for the 
collective-owned properties was also considered too low and should be revised; 
(3) besides some amenities concerns, suggestions were made regarding a 
residential plot in the east of the redevelopment site, the idea of which was to 
redistribute the development rights thereupon into other residential plots by 
further increasing the planned FAR (Liede Villager Committee, 2005).  
As an important side note, in order to protect public interest, the city 
Table 1. Comparison of redevelopment figures for Liede village 
Components Redevelopment plan 
in 2005 
Final redevelopment 
plan  
overall floorspace 
(㎡) 
916,000 1,421,000 
residential floorspace 
(㎡) 
665,000 687,000 
construction floorspace of 
collective properties 
(㎡) 
120,000 174,000 
net FAR 3.95 5.52 (including 
auctioned land plot) 
Sources: GTDUPB (2005); GUPB (2007); GURB (2012a).  
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government had excluded real estate developers from taking part in Liede village 
redevelopment since 1999. This was done through the government’s monopoly 
over the primary land market, with the assumption that developers might push 
up the redvelopment FAR or cause more social conflicts because of insufficient 
compensation—both of which had indeed occurred in some urban renewal 
projects in Guangzhou during the mid-1990s (Lin, 2013). Regarding the requisite 
funds for urban village redevleopment, the government spelt out three principles, 
i.e. ‘no governmental investment’, ‘no sourcing from real estate developments’, 
and ‘those who would benefit the most shall invest’ (Yan et al., 2004). These 
principles were essentially saying that it was the villagers who should provide 
funds for any redevelopment, while the city government, as the monopolistic 
owner of urban land around the village, was merely to take a containment 
attitude towards the negative externalities of future redevelopment activities in 
an urban village. Without ‘eminent’ needs for intervention, the city government 
would rather leave urban villages to their own devices than step onto the 
collective turf by taking substantive measures. 
When eminent needs emerge: activation of a redevelopment growth 
machine 
During the second half of the 2000s, the preparations for hosting the 16th Asian 
Games had given a significant impetus to urban village redevelopment in 
Guangzhou. The event was viewed by the city government as an unique 
opportunity to showcase a thriving urban image through enhanced physical 
infrastucture and built environment. And the focus of Guangzhou’s 
redevelopment policies was shifted accordingly from controlling redevelopment 
densities and balancing public interests to one that is very much motivated 
towards urban beautification, improvement of public facilities and quick 
achievement. In this context, primarily because of its central location and a plan 
to build an arterial road through the village, Liede was singled out as a priority 
redevelopment project (GURB, 2012a).  
   In 2007, the city government launched an initiative to redevelop Liede, 
featuring a three-pronged principle of ‘government guidance, villagers’ decision 
and developers’ participation’. The government not only removed the previous 
barrier of excluding developer involvement, but also helped accelerate the 
project by using a new land auction method as well as forging a co-operative 
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relationship between two major developers, the R&F Properties and the KWG 
Property. To enthuse the villagers and developers, the city government made 
huge concessions on the redevelopment FAR by promising unusual on-site 
resettlement standards—which increased the total planned residential 
floorspace to 687,000 m² (GUPB, 2007). Through consolidating previously 
scattered collective properties, the redevelopment plan also included a 174,000 
m² hotel as part of the compensation package to Liede village (GURB, 2012a). 
All planned construction included, the total net FAR of Liede redevelopment was 
to reach 5.52 (see Table 1). The government even offered tax and fee 
exemptions, and agreed to refund Liede village the total net income from 
auctioning a small portion of the redevelopment site—the plot was sold to the 
developers for fund-raising in order to kick-start the redevelopment growth 
machine.  
Redevelopment growth machine at work 
During the run-up to the 16th Asian Games, the Liede village redevelopment 
coalition had been functioning smoothly, with each party playing appropriate role 
in accelerating the process. 
Liede villagers are key stakeholders in the redevelopment; as the community 
organisation for self-management, the villager committee was highly effective in 
handling a range of issues: from ascertaining the costs of redevelopment, to 
bargaining with the developers on land-financing, and negotiating with the city 
government over the redevelopment scheme. Meanwhile, the villager committee 
also checked with each household on their resettlement arrangements, solicited 
villagers’ opinions on the redevelopment scheme and put in place temporary 
off-site relocation plans before demolition was in motion. Without the 
well-organised work of the villager committee, temporary off-site relocation could 
not have been finished in just three months. 
Throughout the redevelopment process, real estate developers had been a 
crucial participant. They had jointly funded the redevelopment project through 
purchasing the auctioned plot, which was later leveraged to their advantage for 
exchange value. Together they invested RMB 10 billion to develop Grade-A 
office buildings, shopping malls, business hotels and serviced apartments on the 
site (Liu, 2013). In addition, by injecting new equity onto the balance sheet, a 
real estate company, Hopewell Holding Limited, was formed to cooperate with 
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Liede’s shareholding company for running another newly-redeveloped business 
hotel, which shall free Liede village from worries of long-term economic returns.  
Most important of all, the city government of Guangzhou had acted as a 
powerful supervisor throughout the redevelopment process. It had created 
exceptional conditions for the project to go ahead, not least by virtue of preparing 
for the Asian Games. In terms of dealing with social conflict, the government had 
managed to ensure fairness in land-leasing, use of redevelopment funds, and 
allocation of resettlement housing. While the city government was pivotal in 
getting the redevelopment growth machine to operate, it had also helped 
balance the power relations and benefits distribution which would ensure the 
completion of a complicated project. 
Thanks to the redevelopment, both the use value and exchange value of 
collective land and properties in Liede have increased substantially. The rise in 
the exchange value of land is mainly reflected in the growth of rental income. It 
was reported that the annual rental income of the collective shareholding 
company had risen from 50 million RMB to 500 million RMB. And on average, 
the housing rents of individual villagers had increased from 10-15 RMB per 
month per m² to 30-50 RMB per month per m², bringing their gross annual 
incomes (including dividends from collective-owned properties) up from 25,000 
RMB to 90,000 RMB (GURB, 2012a). In terms of the use value of land, the 
physical environment of Liede village has been completely transformed into a 
neighbourhood of high-rise apartments, with greatly improved amenities (Liu et 
al., 2012b). For the benefit of the wider public, the city government had through 
land consolidation legally acquired 78,000 m² of land for the provision of 
amenities right beside the city centre (GUPB, 2007). In addition, 
newly-developed business and office properties are also expected to bring 
considerable long-term tax revenues and employment opportunities. 
Apparently, the redevelopment of Liede village has resulted in a ‘win-win’ 
situation among the city government, village collective/villagers and developers. 
However, one must not read this particular case off the reason why the growth 
coalition had been viable in the first place. From the city government’s 
containment attitude towards Liede to active coordination and supervision over 
its redevelopment, the turning point arrived at a time when needs to beautify an 
unavoidable corner of the new city centre became highly desirable. Despite 
some indirect gains on and around the village land, the city government had 
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made considerable concessions to redevelop Liede, while allowing the village 
collective and investing developers to function as a growth coalition to serve a 
larger purpose. Indigenous villagers, with on-site resettlement and reimbursed 
rental housing, have benefited the most from the increased use and exchange 
value of a redeveloped village; the village collective, as a structural entrepreneur 
devoted to parochial landed interest, has managed to augment differential rents 
as well as redistributive rents by “influencing the larger arena of decision making 
that will determine locational advantage” (Logan and Molotch, 1987, p.30). The 
involved developers, by strategically realising exchange value through 
redevelopment, have been active players in bankrolling the project. 
The success of Liede redevelopment was meant to offer a model solution to 
the chronic urban village problem in Guangzhou. Yet shortly after the 16th Asian 
Games, there has been a dramatic change of plan since the new municipal Party 
Secretary took office at the end of 2011. All the more intriguing is that: further 
considerations seem to have emerged from the government side, which has 
practically held back this kind of growth machine from redeveloping other urban 
villages in the city. 
Redevelopment growth machine deactivated 
Since May 2012, the city government of Guangzhou has approved no more 
urban village redevelopment plans. The previously announced city-wide 
redevelopment scheme targeting 52 urban villages has likewise been 
suspended. The reasons behind, as the following analysis reveals, must be 
understood in a wider policy context. 
   Firstly, perhaps quite unexpected by the city government, large-scale urban 
village redevelopments had turned out to be a potential threat to its land-leasing 
revenues. Up until the 16th Asian Games, the city government had raised a 
considerable amount of construction funds by establishing government-owned 
investment vehicles to mortgage urban land for bank loans; and the resulting 
urgency in debt repayments compelled the government to continue acquiring 
and leasing more land in the urban fringe areas through further developing new 
towns. Meanwhile, macro regulations over the national real estate market had 
curbed demand for urban construction land, causing a steady decline in the 
transaction volume. What Figures 2 & 3 show is the diminishing ratio of trading 
quantity to supply quantity of residential and commercial land, and a 
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corresponding decrease in annual land-leasing revenue. The Guangzhou city 
government was quick to place the blame on the already approved urban village 
redevelopment plans—which were to supply 11.9 million m² floorspace of new 
developments on collective land in the inner city (GURB, 2012b)—for impacting 
on the demand for land in fringe areas and causing the drop in land-leasing 
revenue.  
 
 
Figure 2. Ratio of trading quantity to supply quantity of residential and commercial land in 
Guangzhou, 2002 to 2011.  
Source: CIA (2003-2012).  
 
 
Figure 3. Annual land-leasing revenue (billion RMB) of urban residential and commercial land in 
Guangzhou, 2002 to 2011.  
Source: CIA (2003-2012). 
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Secondly, ‘the 56th Policy’ of 2009 on ‘Sanjiu Gaizao’ had included a principle 
encouraging ‘self-initiated redevelopment and transaction of commercial-use 
plots through closed-door negotiation’. Considering this kind of transaction was 
least transparent and most easily manipulated, the city government feared that it 
would direct more developers away from competitive transaction of urban village 
land and lead to a decrease in land-leasing premiums for the government’s 
extra-budgetary income. As a result, from June 2012, ‘the 56th Policy’ has been 
superseded by a new policy document, which in effect has strengthened 
governmental control over urban village redevelopment. 
Furthermore, large-scale urban village redevelopments also posed a serious 
problem for the city government to manage the built environment. Before 
redevelopment, urban villages at central locations were already very dense—for 
instance, the original gross FARs of Xiancun village, Yangji village and Linhe 
village had all exceeded 3.0. The approved redevelopment FARs for the former 
two are understood to be well above 6.0 (GURB, 2012b), much higher than that 
of Liede. This upward spiral hardly bodes well for the city government’s planning 
control. In addition, under the 56th Policy, there was much room for villagers and 
developers to possibly ‘collaborate’ on the proposed redevelopment FARs and 
misrepresent the actual cost of redevelopment for getting as much 
compensation from the process. Left with little say in ascertaining the 
redevelopment FARs, the city government felt that it was simply unable to 
monitor either the total floorspace of in-kind compensation or the cost of 
redevelopment.  
And such are the underlying reasons for a new leadership of the Guangzhou 
government to have held up urban village redevelopment. The latest progress 
since has included: closed-door negotiations for land-leasing in urban villages 
were tightened up and replaced by either public tender, auction, or listing—all 
more transparent and competitive ways to increase the government’s 
land-leasing income; as regards the redevelopment FARs being pushed up by 
exaggerated cost of redevelopment, the city government has stepped up 
measures to monitor the actual costs by carrying out the work with relevant 
village collectives, while excluding developers from such verification processes. 
Discussion and conclusion  
In recent years, there has been growing interest for local governments in China 
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to engage in redevelopment activities as a result of increasing shortages of 
urban development land. Against this background, urban village redevelopment 
has become a heated issue. From a political-economic perspective, when 
compared with more established theoretical frameworks to comprehend China’s 
urban growth, redevelopment of urban villages still remains a much-debated yet 
under-synthesised field of enquiry. By investigating the land-based interests of   
major coalitional parties through the case study of Liede, this research is 
intended to explore the (de-)activation of a growth machine for urban village 
redevelopment in the policy context of Guangzhou. 
To bring forward the role of place entrepreneurs in engineering locality 
growth, a revised typology has been proposed for this study. Accentuating land 
and property interests and (local) state dominance in redeveloping an urban 
village, we have identified four (types of) place entrepreneurs as the main parties 
in a growth coalition, i.e. serendipitous entrepreneurs, active institutional 
entrepreneurs, structural entrepreneurs, and monopolistic land manager and 
place entrepreneur. In retrospect, however, as shown by the shifting course of 
urban village redevelopment in Guangzhou, the power of local government 
obviously prevails. 
The case study shows that the growth machine thesis is very helpful to reveal 
the complicated stakeholder relations and highlight the dynamic exchange of 
powers between the different players. It offers a good analytical framework for 
the study of urban village redevelopment process. As the strongest party in the 
collation, the city government may activate or de-activate the growth machine in 
urban village redevelopment, only to rebalance the benefits shared by different 
parties. Decision on Liede Village has been influenced by the Asian Games, 
which reflected the market conditions at the time. Indeed, urban village 
redevelopment in all Chinese cities require a particular market and economic 
condition. When the economic growth is at a high speed and property market 
inflation is high, urban village redevelopment is easier; otherwise, there will be 
less incentive for activating the growth machine. While the Asian Games 
provided a momentum for economic development at a particular point for 
Guangzhou, other events could have a similar effect at a different time and 
location. Given the general pattern of power structure, the detailed practice of 
redevelopment indeed may vary. 
   Rooted in a dichotomous system, the collective ownership of village land 
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provides an important variation on the operation of growth machine in China. 
With many legal ambiguities of the land ownership, collective land could be 
interpreted and treated very differently in different places even within the same 
city. The Liede case here shows that a stronger, active and united village 
collective organisation—the village committee, will be essential for the 
successful and timely operation of the growth machine which brings favourable 
economic benefits to the households who shared the ownership of the land. On 
one hand, urban villagers have fought hard for both the use and exchange 
values to be reaped from serendipitous land and property after redevelopment. 
On the other hand, the village collective, when negotiating on behalf of the 
locality, are structurally parochial not only in physical scale, but also in the scope 
of power; its manoeuvring is centred on further densification of the built 
environment for rent-seeking, but will only be effective to a certain extent. When 
facing local government’s decision-making power, the collective has to yield to a 
higher-level authority bearing down on local fortunes. Nonetheless, the benefits 
local government can gain from such redevelopment would be arguably less 
about returns in terms of use value or exchange value on collective land 
(although indirectly it does get some); nor is one particular urban village the only 
concern for the government to address. As the proxy owner of state land within 
its administrative area, local government—in this research the Guangzhou city 
government—has its own land-based interests to pursue. Yet given the territorial 
mandate to balance as well as prioritise certain (re)development policies, it does 
have the need to tackle knotty issues such as redeveloping existing urban 
villages.  
   In the case of Liede, an endorsing local government, enterprising villagers 
and village collective, and the financial input of developers are all part and parcel 
of a unique kind of growth machine. However, the deactivation of similar projects 
soon afterwards has revealed something more about the underlying logic of local 
decision-making. It would seem that the city government will have a variety of 
policy goals to juggle—economic, political, social, etc.—before deciding whether 
or not to proceed with urban village redevelopment, or indeed, any kind of major 
development schemes. Normally, urban village redevelopment is high upon 
policy agenda because it tends to be physical changes with ready visibility. Often 
a thorny issue, successful redevelopment, especially those at central locations, 
would usually be viewed as a major achievement for the office term of a certain 
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leadership. However, should there be more immediate concerns emerging, say 
fiscal constraints, things could also quickly change track. What is more, in a 
decentralised administrative system, local governments in China are 
empowered to make certain hard-and-fast rules. Typical instances include 
making policy exceptions (e.g. through planning), granting/excluding entry of 
market forces into local projects, and harnessing social participation in urban 
policy-making, etc. By exploring why Liede village had been successfully rebuilt 
before the 2010 Asian Games and what reason has led to the halt of similar 
redevelopment projects in Guangzhou, this research attempts to offer a 
political-economic approach for explanation. 
   In the past, the growth machine model has been mainly focused on the local 
level. This study, however, has attempted to set the case of Liede village in a 
wider urban policy context. Such an effort by no means seeks to provide a 
generalised Chinese growth machine model through a one-off project. As 
another article in this special issue illustrates, the perspective of urban regime 
may also, on a different theoretical plane as well as spatial scale, be useful for 
interpreting various redevelopment policies and practices in China. With a 
comparative view in mind, though, it is hoped that this paper could further 
engage Western theorisation with Chinese reality, especially by exploiting the 
potential of urban political-economic perspectives to unravel some challenging 
issues in a fast-urbanising China. Urban village redevelopment, in this respect, 
is still in need of more theoretical cross-pollination and inspiration.  
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